

she would have become a tenured employee and would then have been entitled to the protections of the CSRA if the OCC had terminated her for plagiarism. As she did not receive these protections, she asserts that she is in a worse position than she would have been absent discrimination. She also asserts that the denial of these protections violated the CSRA and the Due Process Clause.

[7] Although one "purpose of Title VII [is] to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination," *Albemarle Paper Co.*, 422 U.S. at 418, 95 S.Ct. at 2372, Castle seeks relief to which she was not entitled as a probationary employee: MSPB participation in the remedial aspect of her discrimination claim. Furthermore, the district court proceedings afforded Castle due process. Castle received notice of and an opportunity to respond to the OCC's claim that she had engaged in plagiarism and should be denied reinstatement and full back pay as a result. She also received thorough written decisions explaining the basis for the district court's agreement with the OCC. Finally, although Castle complains that she did not receive an appeal to the MSPB, we have already concluded that she was not entitled to such an appeal. While the incidental effect of the court's remedial decision may have been to deny Castle certain rights she would have enjoyed under the CSRA had the remedy included reinstatement, this factor does not render the decision legally erroneous or an abuse of discretion.

[8, 9] Finally, assuming the district court had authority to decide the after-acquired evidence issue, Castle argues that the court was required to find not only that the OCC would have terminated her for plagiarism, but also that the MSPB would have sustained the termination, a finding the court did not make. Castle refers to *Tri v. Securities and Exchange Commission*, 24 M.S.P.R. 90 (1984), and suggests that the court could not have made such a finding because termination is an excessive penalty for plagiarism as a matter of law.

The district court may not deny reinstatement based on after-acquired evidence of

misconduct if the employer could not lawfully have fired the employee for that conduct. Castle has not, however, shown that termination is an excessive penalty for plagiarism. In the *Tri* decision on which she relies, the MSPB held that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management was not entitled to reconsideration of an order mitigating an employee's removal to a demotion, where the employee had committed plagiarism and failed to meet minimum performance standards. *Tri* did not, however, discuss the nature or circumstances of the plagiarism, nor did it hold that an agency may never terminate an employee for plagiarism. *Tri* merely held that a challenge to the Board's application of *Douglas v. Veterans Admin.*, 5 MSPB 313, 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981) (establishing standards governing mitigation of penalties), to the facts of a particular case is not a basis for reconsideration because it is not an allegation of error in the Board's interpretation of a civil service law, rule, or regulation. Thus, *Tri* does not establish that termination is an excessive penalty for plagiarism as a matter of law.

Because Castle's arguments are without merit, we grant the Secretary's motion for summary affirmance.



**BANGOR HYDRO-ELECTRIC
COMPANY, Petitioner,**

v.

**FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, Respondent.**

**United States Department of the Interior;
United States Department of
Commerce, Intervenors.**

No. 95-1083.

United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Jan. 19, 1996.

Decided March 15, 1996.

Hydroelectric company petitioned for judicial review of Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (FERC) order requiring company to comply with Department of Interior fishing prescription. The Court of Appeals, Silberman, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) Commission, rather than Department, was proper respondent on company's petition, and (2) Department had not provided substantial evidence to support its finding that escapement of 315,000 alewives was necessary to reach Department's goal of \$2.3 million alewife run on river and, thus, Commission order, requiring company to comply with Department fishway prescription, requiring that company construct fishway passage on river on which company operated hydroelectric plant, would be vacated.

Vacated.

1. Fish ⇐12

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), rather than Department of Interior, was proper respondent on hydroelectric company's petition for judicial review of Commission order requiring company to comply with Department fishing prescription, despite contention that Department was real governmental party in interest because company was actually challenging Department's fishway prescription, concerning which Commission took no position; order on review was that of Commission, and company had been "aggrieved" within meaning of statute governing judicial review of Commission orders. Federal Power Act, §§ 18, 313(b), as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 811, 825l (b).

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

2. Fish ⇐12

Court of Appeals would not grant Department of Interior's motion to add evidence to record before Court, on hydroelectric company's petition for judicial review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order requiring company to comply with Department fishing prescription; Department had no excuse for not including in record before Commission any evidence it wished to rely on in Court of Appeals. Federal Power Act, § 18, as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. § 811; 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(b)(1).

3. Fish ⇐12

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) did not have responsibility to inquire into Department of Interior's internal decisionmaking process before issuing order requiring hydroelectric company to comply with Department fishing prescription; it was not Commission's role to judge validity of Department's position, substantially or procedurally. Federal Power Act, § 18, as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. § 811.

4. Fish ⇐12

Department of Interior had not provided substantial evidence to support its finding that escapement of 315,000 alewives was necessary to reach Department's goal of 2.3 million alewife run on river and, thus, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order, requiring hydroelectric company to comply with Department fishway prescription, requiring that company construct fishway passage on river on which company operated hydroelectric plant, would be vacated. Federal Power Act, § 18, as amended, 16 U.S.C.A. § 811.

On Petition for Review of Orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

John A. Whittaker, IV, Washington, DC, argued the cause for petitioner, with whom William J. Madden, Jr., was on the briefs.

Edward S. Geldermann, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Bethesda, MD, argued the cause for respondent, with whom Jerome M. Feit, Solicitor, Washington, DC, and Joseph S. Davies, Deputy Solicitor, Bethesda, MD, were on the brief. Eric L. Christensen, Washington, DC, entered an appearance.

Jonathan F. Klein, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued the cause for intervenors, with whom Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Anne S. Almy, and John A. Bryson, attorneys, were on the brief.

Henri D. Bartholomot and Donald H. Clarke, Washington, DC, were on the joint brief for amici curiae.

Before: SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Bangor Hydro-Electric petitions for review of a FERC order requiring it to comply with a Department of Interior fishing prescription. Interior has not provided reasonable support for its prescription, and we therefore grant the petition.

I.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Bangor a license to continue to operate a hydropower facility located on the Union River in Ellsworth, Maine. The license required Bangor to develop a plan for fish passage, consistent with any future prescription made by the Secretary of the Interior. Bangor submitted a plan relying extensively on trucking salmon and alewives, unable to swim back to their spawning areas due to the presence of Bangor's facility, from an existing trap facility¹ to locations upstream. Bangor committed to constructing permanent upstream fish passage facilities—the main alternative to trucking—only if the salmon run (fish coming downstream after spawning) exceeded 500 for three consecutive years.

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an arm of the Department of Interior, notified FERC that it did not approve of the Bangor plan and that pursuant to § 18 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (1985), it would require Bangor to construct permanent upstream fish passages five years after the issuance of the license. Section 18 provides:

The Commission shall require the construction, maintenance, and operation by a licensee at its own expense of . . . such fishways as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate.

Id. The FWS explained:

Given that the run of alewives could soon reach its ultimate size of 2.3 million fish, we believe that the permanent fish passage facilities should be [constructed] . . . The

permanent facilities would initially be used by alewives, but should also be designed to accommodate a run of up to 1000 salmon.

Bangor estimated that the fishways would cost approximately \$2 million and \$30,000 in lost power benefits annually. Interior was unmoved, explaining: "[W]e will not sacrifice fish passage effectiveness or compromise fishery management objectives . . . *simply due to cost considerations.*" (emphasis added).

The Commission issued an order modifying Bangor's proposed fish passage plan requiring it to conform to FWS' fishway prescription. *Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.*, 66 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,079 (1994). It refused to consider Bangor's contention that the FWS personnel lacked authority to require a § 18 fishway prescription because the Secretary of Interior had not properly delegated that authority, explaining that the Commission should not "dispute the effectiveness of Interior's delegation practices." *Id.* at 64,254. FERC also declined to consider Bangor's arguments concerning the need for the fishway prescription or the process by which Interior decided to require the fishway, concluding that under *Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians*, 466 U.S. 765, 104 S.Ct. 2105, 80 L.Ed.2d 753 (1984), and *Lynchburg Hydro. Assoc.*, 39 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,079 (1987), it had no choice but to require Bangor to construct the fishways. Bangor unsuccessfully sought rehearing. The Commission issued a stay of its order, which required Bangor to begin construction, pending completion of judicial review. *Bangor Hydro-Electric*, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,216 (1995). On appeal, Bangor repeats its due process and evidentiary arguments and challenges FERC's refusal to consider them.

II.

[1] We are met at the outset with a rather novel jurisdictional argument from the government (the Department) as intervenor. It claims that FERC is the wrong respondent. Interior is the real governmental party in interest because Bangor is actually challenging Interior's fishway prescription,

fish management purposes.

1. The fish trapping facility is used for various

concerning which the Commission takes no position. Therefore, the petition should be denied. In *Escondido*, 466 U.S. at 778 & n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 2113 & n. 20, the Supreme Court, interpreting this unusual statute, explained that in these sorts of cases² the Commission is obliged to include the Department's prescription, but is free, if a petition for review is filed, to support, oppose, or remain neutral regarding the prescription.

Nevertheless, the order on review is undeniably that of the Commission. The relevant statutory section provides:

Any party to a proceeding under this Act aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order . . . by filing . . . a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside . . .

16 U.S.C. § 825l (b) (1985) (emphases added). It seems beyond question that petitioner has been aggrieved within the meaning of that provision by the Commission's order regardless of the Commission's reasons for including the prescription in the order. It follows therefore that FERC is the appropriate named respondent even if the real defense is to be mounted by Interior as intervenor.

[2] The Commission agrees with that reading, but suggests to us that the record should be remanded to it because Interior wishes to put in more material. But Interior has filed a motion to add to the record before us. Interior, consistent with its view that it is the proper respondent, seems to be treating the case as if petitioner were challenging a prescription that stemmed from a departmental "informal adjudication" à la *Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), instead of from FERC's more formal licensing proceeding. See *U.S. Dep't of Interior v. FERC*, 952 F.2d 538 (D.C.Cir.1992); *Cooley v. FERC*, 843 F.2d 1464, 1472-73 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933, 109 S.Ct. 327, 102 L.Ed.2d 344 (1988) (Commission erred in not

addressing all the relevant evidence). We deny Interior's motion, and we also think it inappropriate to remand to FERC. *Escondido* explained that "the license applicant can seek review of the conditions in the court of appeals, but the court is to sustain the conditions if they are consistent with law and supported by the evidence presented to the Commission, either by the Secretary or other interested parties." 466 U.S. at 778 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 2113 n. 20 (emphasis added). The government contends this language in *Escondido* is only dicta, and it should not be read as confining Interior to the record before FERC. It may be dicta, but Supreme Court dicta tends to have somewhat greater force—particularly when expressed so unequivocally. Even were we not bound by it, however, we think the Court correctly devised the interrelationship between Interior and FERC. If Congress had intended Interior to have authority to require prescriptions independent of the Commission's licensing process, it could easily have so specified. By providing instead that Interior's prescription is to be a FERC license requirement, Congress implicitly indicated that it would have to be supported as would any other Commission licensing requirement. The record before us, then, is no more and no less than what was presented to the Commission. The Commission appears to have correctly recognized this point; its regulation states that when the Department submits a prescription the Department "must specifically identify and explain . . . the prescriptions and their evidentiary and legal basis." 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(b)(1) (1995) (emphasis added). To be sure, this is an unorthodox administrative proceeding, but *Escondido*'s reading of the statute and the Commission's regulation is abundantly clear, and we therefore think Interior had no excuse for not including any evidence it wished to rely on, in the court of appeals, in the record before the Commission. It is simply too late now to seek to shore up its case.

2. *Escondido* concerned § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1985), which provides that licenses shall be subject to such conditions that are deemed necessary by the Secretary of the department which supervises a reservation "for the adequate protection and utilization of [that] res-

ervation." The parties do not contest (nor could they) FERC's conclusion in *Lynchburg*, 39 F.E.R.C. ¶61,079, that § 18 imposes a similar duty on the Commission to include fishway prescriptions imposed by the Secretary of Interior in licenses.

[3] It also follows, we think, that petitioner's claim that FERC had some sort of responsibility to inquire into Interior's internal decisionmaking process must be rejected. Under this statute, FERC performs primarily as a neutral forum responsible for compiling the record for the benefit of the court of appeals. It may subsequently on review take a position or not as it wishes, but it is certainly not its responsibility to investigate or prosecute any part of the case below. Moreover, since the record must be the one presented to the Commission, Interior's internal deliberations are not typically relevant. The Commission retains authority to issue the underlying license, and if Interior's prescription were to be regarded by the Commission as somehow incompatible with a license, FERC could surely refuse to issue it. However, it is not the Commission's role to judge the validity of Interior's position—substantially or procedurally.

III.

[4] The judicial review provision governing petitions for review of FERC orders was drafted long before the passage of the APA; concerning the scope of review, it explicitly states only that the finding of "the Commission as to the facts if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive." § 825l (b) (emphasis added). But the Supreme Court in *Escondido* observed (as seems inevitable) that a reviewing court must determine whether Interior's prescription is "consistent with law" or "reasonably related to [its] goal." 466 U.S. at 778 & n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 2113 & n. 20. In the latter formulation, the Court reads the statute implicitly as providing review on arbitrary and capricious grounds.³ And petitioner makes an arbitrary and capricious challenge; it contends

that the costs of Interior's prescription far outweigh any benefits to fish or the general environment and is therefore unreasonable. Interior responds—somewhat peculiarly—that although under the statute it is *authorized* to take costs into account, it is not *required* to do so. We rather doubt that is the case, but it is not necessary to resolve that dispute, because even assuming Interior's position is correct, we believe its support for the prescription is not adequate to meet the statute and *Escondido*'s standard.

Interior's core position is that, in order to obtain its goal of a 2.3 million alewife run, it is necessary that "a minimum of 315,000 and perhaps as many as 800,000 adult alewives should be returned to upstream spawning areas" (called an "escapement"). Although all parties describe this as a "finding," it is, of course, not so much a determination of historical fact as a prediction based on opinions or inferences drawn from certain facts. See *Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel*, 865 F.2d 288, 309 (D.C.Cir.1988). If Interior is correct in that conclusion, it is undisputed that Bangor could not truck this number of alewives upstream. Interior expresses a secondary concern for salmon using the fishway to return upstream, which Interior contemplates could reach a run of 1,000. Finally, Interior mentions in passing that the fishway could be used by blueback herring, American shad, and American eel, which serve as forage for other fish and avian predators. Upstream trucking for these species may be inadequate given the risk that the fish may be placed beyond their natal stream areas, which could adversely affect spawning. Interior suggests that this is likely to be a particular problem for blueback herring (which are difficult to distinguish from alewives) because blueback herring require free-flowing water for spawning.

3. The APA's "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" standard connotes the same substantive standard of review. The substantial evidence standard is "only a specific application of [the more general arbitrary and capricious review], separately recited in the APA not to establish a more rigorous standard of *factual* support but to emphasize that in the case of formal proceedings the factual support must be found in the closed record as opposed to elsewhere." *Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors*, 745 F.2d 677,

683 (D.C.Cir.1984). See also *Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC*, 761 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C.Cir. 1985). But, the term "arbitrary and capricious" more naturally fits a determination of a mixed question of factfinding and policy implementation—which is what we have before us. See, e.g., *Kisser v. Cisneros*, 14 F.3d 615, 619 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (in applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard a court examines whether there is a rational connection between the facts and the choice made).

Bangor vigorously contests the need for an escapement of 315,000 (let alone 800,000) alewives to reach Interior's goal of a 2.3 million alewife run. Data from other river systems indicate that there is not a strong relationship between the escapement rate and alewife run; small spawning escapements often produce large runs. In the Union River itself, an escapement of 12,720 produced an alewife harvest of 1,026,200, while the largest escapement, 22,200, produced a harvest of 832,900. From this, Bangor argues that at most an escapement of 100,000 is needed, a number which can be trucked upstream. In any event, 315,000 is certainly not necessary.

Bangor also points out that the salmon run for the last 20 years has never exceeded 295 and that in 1992 only four salmon were caught at the fish trapping facility. The number of salmon affected is unlikely to increase given the discontinuance of a program in 1992 which stocked salmon in the Union River. It is at best uncertain when, if ever, the stocking program will be resumed, but Bangor has committed to building a fishway passage if the salmon run reaches 500 for three consecutive years. As to Interior's other justifications, Bangor asserts that there is no evidence that there is any lack of food for predators which feed on the fish that may use a fishway passage and that blueback herring can easily be sorted from alewives since they spawn later than alewife. In any event, Interior's concern about blueback herring seems misplaced since in 1992 the same fish trap caught no blueback herring.

Interior is quite open about its policy view that it prefers fishways to alternative escapement remedies. It is, of course, entitled to a good deal of deference concerning its policy choice. That does not mean that Interior is not obliged to show some reasonable support for its determination to insist on that requirement *in this case*. It will not do to present only a "Field of Dreams" justification ("If you build it, they will come."). Interior's difficulty in this proceeding in which the key dispute is the appropriate escapement rate

for alewives (Interior's concern for the other fish seems quite strained), is that it relies only on conclusory assertions. It does refer to a management plan put out by the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission which allegedly concludes that the escapement rate for alewives should be between 40 and 75% of an annual run in order to rebuild and increase the run. This plan, unfortunately for Interior, is not in the record.⁴ Petitioner, in contrast, presented an expert's report dealing with the relevant biological data from various river systems including the Union River, which quite pointedly undermines Interior's opinion or prediction that a 315,000 escapement is justified. Under these circumstances, we think we must conclude that Interior has not provided reasonable support—"substantial evidence"—for its "finding" and its requirement is not "reasonably related to its goal."

* * * * *

For the preceding reasons, FERC's order requiring Bangor to comply with Interior's fishway prescription is vacated.



Mohammad Ali SABA, Appellee

v.

**COMPAGNIE NATIONALE AIR
FRANCE, Appellant.**

No. 94-7211.

United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Oct. 30, 1995.

Decided March 15, 1996.

Shipper brought action against air carrier for damage to portion of international shipment of Persian carpets. The United

do so.

4. Interior originally sought to add this report to the record on appeal but no longer attempts to